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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case presents a question of first impression: whether an officer’s observation of
snow on a vehicle’s license plate provides a sufficient basis to conduct a traffic stop.
While driving down the highway on a snowy day, Mr. St. Clair was stopped by a police
officer for having snow on his rear windshield, and the officer also saw that snow had covered
the car’s license plate. As a result of the stop, the officer found drugs. Mr. St. Clair filed a
motion to suppress, challenging the reasonableness of the initial traffic stop under the Fourth
Amendment.

The district court denied the motion, concluding that although the snow on the

rear window did not provide a sufficient basis for conducting the traffic stop, the snow on the
license plate did. The district court found that having snow on the license plate violated Idaho’s
license display statute’s requirement that license plates “be maintained” free from foreign
materials and in a condition to be clearly legible. The district court also found that the Idaho
Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Tregeagle, 161 Idaho 763, 767 (Ct. App. 2017), dictated
the result in this case, although Tregeagle dealt with a different requirement of the statute.
On appeal, Mr. St. Claire asserts that the State failed to carry its burden of demonstrating
that the stop in this case was constitutionally reasonable.

Contrary to the district court’s

conclusion, the operation of a vehicle with snow on the license plate during inclement weather
conditions is not a violation of Idaho law, and the denial of Mr. St. Claire’s suppression motion
should be reversed.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts were established at the suppression hearing.1
On a December morning in 2016, Idaho State Police Sergeant Ken Yount was patrolling
southbound on Highway 95 in Nez Perce County, Idaho, near the Clearwater River Casino. It
was a snowy day, with quite a bit a snow accumulation on the highway. (Tr., p.11, Ls.8-24;
R., p.69.) The road had been plowed, but there was wet snow pack and slushy conditions; the
police had already investigated a number of car crashes and highway slide-offs. (Tr., p.12, Ls.116.; R., p.71.) While patrolling, Sergeant Yount observed a Silver Honda Civic that was driving
southbound with snow covering the rear license plate and portions of the rear window.
(Tr., p.13, Ls.1-10; R., p.71.) Based upon his concern that the driver could not see out the rear
window, Sergeant Yount initiated a stop of the vehicle. (Tr., p.13, Ls.2-6; R., p.69.)
During the stop, Sergeant Yount learned that Mr. St. Clair’s driver’s license was
suspended and arrested him. (Tr., p.22, L.6-11.) During the search incident to that arrest,
Sergeant Yount discovered methamphetamine, and arrested him for that as well. (Tr., p.22,
Ls.12-19.) Based on evidence discovered during the stop, the State charged Mr. St. Clair with
felony possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.18, 39.)
Mr. St. Clair filed a motion to suppress, claiming the initial stop was unlawful and
violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizures. (R., p.59.) In response, the
State offered two justifications for the stop: first, that the snow on the rear windshield provided
the officer a reasonable basis to believe there was a violation of I.C. § 49-612(3), which prohibits

1

The State called one witness, Officer Yount (See generally Tr., pp.8-33); the parties stipulated
to the admission of the video recording of the stop taken from the patrol car’s in-car camera (see
Tr., p.15, L.1; Exhibit 1), and to the admission of three photos – still shots from that video (see
Tr., p.28, Ls.4-12; Exhibits 2, 3, and 4).
2

driving when snow-coated windows obstruct the driver’s view 2; and second, that the snow
covering the license plate provided the officer a reasonable basis to believe there was a violation
of I.C. § 49-428(2), which is the license display statute, which contains an affirmative duty
requiring license plates “be maintained” free of foreign materials and in a condition to be legible.
(Tr., p.34, L.2 – p.41, L.5.)
Based upon its review of the video and photos, the district court found that the snow on
the rear window did not obstruct the driver’s view, and therefore the stop was not justified under
the window-obstruction statute, I.C. § 49-612(3). (R., p.71.) The district court concluded,
however, that having snow on the license plate was a violation of the license display statute,
I.C. § 49-428(2), and held the stop was valid on that basis. (R., p.71.) The district court
highlighted the language of the license display statute that requires all license plates “be
maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible.” I.C. § 49428(2). (R., p.71.) The district court cited the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Tregeagle,
161 Idaho 763, 767 (Ct. App. 2017), which involved the obstruction of a license plate by a trailer
ball hitch, as compelling authority for holding the stop was lawful. (R. p.72.) The district court
concluded that, “based on the obstruction to the license plate, the trooper had reasonable and
articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop.” (R., p.72.)
Mr. St. Clair filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting the district court had
misinterpreted and misapplied the statute. (R., p.78.) The district court denied the motion,
stating it was unable to distinguish this case from State v. Tregeagle. (R., p.83.)

2

The pertinent language of the statute provides: “No vehicle shall be operated when the
windshield and/or windows of the vehicle are coated with ice, snow, sleet, or dust to the
extent that the driver’s view ahead, or to the sides or rear of the vehicle are obstructed.”
I.C. § 49-612(3).
3

Following the denial of his motions, Mr. St. Clair entered a conditional plea of guilty to
possession of a methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. (R., p.90; Tr., p.57, Ls.1-5.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, the district
court entered an order withholding judgment and placed Mr. St. Claire on probation. (Tr., p.56,
Ls.5-11; R., p.98.) Mr. St. Clair filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.102).

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. St Clair’s motion to suppress?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. St. Claire’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The district court erroneously concluded that the observation of snow on the license plate

provided the officer a lawful basis to conduct the traffic stop. Contrary to the conclusion of the
district court, the snow covering the license plate did not violate Idaho Code § 49-428(2)’s
requirement that license plates “be maintained free from foreign material and in a condition to be
clearly legible.” The district court also erred when it applied the holding in State v. Tregeagle –
which dealt with a different provision of the statute, specifically, the requirement that license
plates be in a “place and position to be clearly visible.” 161 Idaho at 767.
B.

Standards Of Review
When reviewing a trial court’s order granting or denying a defendant’s motion to

suppress, this Court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009).

Factual findings that are not supported by

substantial and competent evidence are clearly erroneous. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659
(2007). “Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting
evidence, and factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court.”
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 804. However, this Court maintains free review over whether the facts
surrounding the search and seizure satisfy constitutional requirements. Henage, 143 Idaho at
658.
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes.
State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory
6

construction. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1999). The language of the statute is to be
given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659. If the language is
clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules
of statutory interpretation. State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000).
C.

The District Court Erroneously Denied Mr. St. Clair’s Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Traffic stops constitute seizures
under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658 (2007); Delaware v.
Prouse, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395–96 (1979).
“A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is a “seizure” of the occupants of the
vehicle and therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.” Hein v.
North Carolina, 135 S.Ct. 530, 538 (2014) (internal citations omitted); State v. Morgan, 154
Idaho 109, 112 (2013).

“To justify this type of seizure, officers need only “reasonable

suspicion” – that is, ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped’ of breaking the law.” Hein, at 538 (internal citations omitted); Morgan, at 112.
Evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment protections is subject to the
exclusionary rule, which requires the suppression of both primary evidence obtained as a direct
result of an illegal search or seizure, and evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of
an illegality, that is, “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
484-85 (1963); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988-98 (1992).
“When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the burden of proving that the search
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or seizure in question was reasonable.” State v Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009) (internal
citations omitted).
In Mr. St. Claire’s case, the district court erred when it concluded that the officer’s
observation of snow covering the license plate provided reasonable suspicion to believe
Mr. St. Claire was violating the license display statute, I.C. § 49-428(2). The district court failed
to give effect statute’s plain meaning, and failed to correctly apply that language to the facts in
this case.
The traffic law at issue in this case is I.C. § 49-428(2), provides:
Every license plate shall at all times be securely fastened to the vehicle to which it
is assigned to prevent the plate from swinging, be at a height not less than twelve
(12) inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom of the plate, be in a place
and position to be clearly visible, and shall be maintained free from foreign
materials and in a condition to be clearly legible, and all registration stickers shall
be securely attached to the license plates and shall be displayed as provided in
section 49-443(4), Idaho Code.
(Emphasis added.)
The district court found that having snow covering the license plate violated the statute,
highlighting the requirement that every license plate “shall be maintained free from foreign
materials and in a condition to be clearly legible. (R., p.71.) The district court reasoned that,
because the Court of Appeals in State v. Tregeagle held that a partial obstruction by trailer ball
hitch violated the statute, 161 Idaho 763, 767, the obstruction caused by the snow in this case
likewise violated the statute. (R., pp.72, 83.) Mr. St. Claire submits that the district court’s
reading and application of the statute were incorrect, as set forth below.
1.

The Duty To Maintain Does Not Require Drivers To Remove Snow While
Driving

The pertinent language of the license display statute requires that license plates “be
maintained” free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible. I.C. § 498

428(2). This language imposes an affirmative duty on owners and operators to maintain their
vehicle’s license plates. See, e.g., Eddy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 388 (2001) (discussing
“shall maintain” language in statutes giving rise to an affirmative duty). Mr. St. Claire asserts
the duty to maintain license plates cannot rationally be read to require vehicle owners and
operators to prevent license plates from coming into contact with snow, sleet, or other natural
elements or temporary weather conditions. Idaho law mandates that license plates “be attached”
to the front and back of the vehicle, I.C. § 49-428(1); that license plates “at all times” be
“fastened to” the vehicle, I.C. § 49-428(1); and that they be in a “position and place” to be
visible, I.C. § 49-428(2). Given these mandates, license plates are necessarily exposed to the
out-of-doors and its then-occurring weather conditions.
The term “maintain” is not defined in the statute. The ordinary meaning of “maintain” is
“to keep in an existing state (as in repair, efficiency, or validity): preserve from failure or
decline.” (htpp://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/maintain (last visited February 23,
2018.)) Given this definition, it cannot be said that Mr. St. Claire failed to “maintain” the license
plate within the plain meaning of the statute; the State made no showing that Mr. St. Claire had
done, or failed to do, any act that would or could have kept his license plate in a state of being
snow-free. (See generally Tr., pp.11-33.)3 The statute’s duty to maintain does not encompass an
obligation to do the impossible – i.e., to prevent snow from contacting the license plate – nor
does it include an obligation to refrain from driving in winter weather. To hold otherwise would
make it impossible for Idahoans to legally drive their vehicles in snow storms or other inclement
weather.

3

Indeed, even the patrol officer who noticed the plates covered with snow while he followed
Mr. St. Claire, remarked that this was “understandable.” (Exhibit A, 11:01:34.)
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2.

The District Court Misread State v. Tregeagle, And Erroneously Applied It To
This Case

In reaching its decision, the district court erroneously relied on State v. Tregeagle, 161
Idaho 763 (Ct. App. 2017). (R., p.72.) This was error, because the Court in Tregeagle dealt with
a different requirement of the license display statute, specifically the requirement that the license
“be in a place and position to be clearly visible.” Id. at 768. (Emphasis added.) The Court held
“a license plate mounted in a place that results in it being partially obstructed from view by a
trailer ball hitch violates” the statute. Id.4 The holding in Tregeagel is not applicable in
Mr. St. Claire’s case. Unlike in Tregeagle, there was no contention or finding that Mr. St. Claire
mounted his plates in a place or position that resulted in its obstruction from view. Rather, the
obstruction resulted, not from his positioning or placement of the plates, but from their exposure
to the then-occurring weather conditions – snow.
Therefore, Tregeagle has no application to the present case.

The question whether

driving with snow on the vehicle’s license plate violates Idaho law remains one of first
impression. Contrary to the reading given by the district court, this Court should hold that the
statute’s plain meaning imposes no duty to keep license plates free from precipitation while
driving in inclement weather.

4

The Court addressed the statute’s “place and position” requirement, holding:
We conclude the pertinent language of I.C. § 49-428(2) is unambiguous. A plain
reading of the statute indicates a license plate must be in a place and a position to
be clearly visible. … As such, a license plate mounted in a place that results in it
being partially obstructed from view by a trailer ball hitch violates the “clearly
visible” requirement.
Id. at 767. (Emphasis added.)
10

CONCLUSION
Mr. St. Claire respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order
denying his motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand his case to the
district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 27th day of February, 2018.

____________/s/_____________
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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